









    RATIONAL ASSERTIBILITY, THE STEERING ROLE OF KNOWLEDGE,   
                           AND PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT 
     In the past couple of decades, there were a couple of major attempts to establish the thesis of pragmatic encroachment – that there is a significant pragmatic ingredient in the truth-conditions for knowledge-ascriptions. Contemporary epistemic contextualism has been around for more than a couple of decades, flaunting the notion of a conversational standard, which is context-dependent, and thus pragmatic, and is claimed to be a component in the semantics of 'know'. Stanley's subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) offered an account of knowledge in the semantics of which stakes play a major role as a pragmatic component. These conceptions were propelled first and foremost by examples of knowledge ascriptions with obvious pragmatic aspects that seemed to require a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions in order to be accounted for.1
     The debate, then, to a large extent, boils down to the question of the extent to which such examples can be accounted for only by pragmatic encroachment (if such accounts are adequate), or whether they can be adequately explained alternatively (an option that DeRose recognized as a major issue underlying the debate, posing a challenge to an opponent of contextualism; and so did Stanley).2 I lay out here a new pragmatic account, portions of which are characteristic of knowledge and related concepts,3 offering a different pragmatic picture that attempts to explain such examples, and much more (and in a much greater detail, elsewhere4). If such an account and its associated explanations are adequate, then the pragmatic aspects of the formative examples can be handled at the pragmatic level exclusively, without pragmatic encroachment into the semantics of knowledge and without leaving much of a need or a motivation for pragmatic encroachment. This is the goal of this essay. Such an account involves general practices -- in particular, of the heuristic of practical inferences, and thus is not ad hoc and is general.5
Section 1: Assertibility, its sub-types, and the variety of norms               Along the way, I present the following components of the account. I will argue that the examples in question, notably DeRose's bank example (as well as Cohen's airport example, and Stanley's variations on DeRose's bank example6), involve, on the one hand, assertions by the actors (the husband and his wife, in DeRose's bank example), judged as intuitive, as well as, on the other hand, retractions from those assertions, also judged as intuitive.7 Such examples display features that must be recognized first and foremost as cognitive phenomena, with prominent linguistic manifestations, since retractions from previous assertions are cognitive phenomena: The speaker must sense, when retracting, that what he deemed assertible before can no longer be considered assertible by him now. Such retractions therefore must be explained qua cognitive phenomena. A speaker making an assertion, or retracting from an assertion she has previously made, and who is competent linguistically and normatively,8 must decide whether to assert or to retract respectively in accordance with what she considers as, or senses to be, assertible. 
   Assertibility amounts to compliance with norms -- applicable norms (in the circumstances) that govern the assertive act. An adequate cognitive explanation of such cases therefore has to deal with such norms. These norms can be linguistic norms – semantic and syntactic; epistemic norms; and ethical norms, to mention a few. Each type of norms projects in turn a notion of assertibility relative to it, e.g., semantic assertibility – compliance with semantic norms, or epistemic assertibility – compliance with epistemic norms. Subjects (responders) gauge, for a given example (and, of course, in real cases as well), whether a given sentence in the example is intuitively acceptable in it.9 Yet a given case may invoke more than one norm. In some such cases, all applicable norms are being complied with, leading to a sense of intuitive acceptability. In others, however, some norm may be violated, leading to a sense of a lack of intuitive acceptability. 
   Specifically, intuitions regarding assertions (actual or potential) made by figures in the example, however, reflect whether such assertions are judged as overall assertible – not merely by compliance with a specific type of norms. Overall assertibility is a complex phenomenon whose components are assertibility vis-à-vis specific types of norms. In some cases, one norm may be violated, whereas another (or others) may be complied with. Different norms in specific cases may exert different pressures, reflecting various degrees of normative violations, or degrees or intensity of compliance with one or more norm. So in some cases, different norms may be aligned -- exert normative pressures in the same direction (e.g., compliance), but in others, different norms may exert pressures in conflicting directions – one norm being complied with, while another is being violated. And the respective degrees of compliance or violation enter into whether or not there is a resultant overall acceptability, or overall assertibility, or overall unacceptability or overall unassertibility (or yield no clear outcome). 
    We live in normatively rich environments. Such norms are salient in pertinent philosophical examples -- e.g., semantic norms (requiring conformity to lexical competence), epistemic norms, ethical norms, and norms that have received special attention by some authors regarding such examples -- Gricean conversational norms.10 Yet Gricean norms were designed to fit cases where conversational participants share a common goal and act cooperatively to achieve it.11 But many conversational cases don't seem to fit the Gricean paradigm, and yet the conversational interchanges are very often conducted successfully. In many cases, the goals of conversational participants partly overlap, and partly not – and may also partly conflict. In some cases, there may be an outright conflict of goals, such as cases of zero-sum games, as in outright adversarial contexts, e.g., legal or court debates between different parties, business negotiations between rival companies, or political exchanges. So other norms need to be called in to account for such cases -- in particular, rational norms. Rational norms give rise to the corresponding feature of rational assertibility (in analogy with semantic assertibility, epistemic assertibility, etc.) 
   So Gricean maxims cover only cases of conversational cooperation with a common goal, whereas the notion of rational assertibility covers much more, as in cases where the parties are not fully cooperating in conversation, sharing some common goals but differing regarding pertinent others, and many other cases of conversations are underpinned by outright conflict, of incompatible goals. As I will elaborate below, the joint deliberational stage, prior to the point where a joint decision has been made, is often one where different actors may have different conceptions regarding what the preferred action is – even when there are common goals and cooperation. Such different conceptions lead to non-shared various intermediate goals -- such as what to do about how to achieve the common goal. When this happens, at this intermediate stage, the Gricean framework tends to break down and not to apply vis-à-vis the jockeying by the deliberational parties regarding which action to take to further the common goal. 
   So the norms I want to draw attention to are norms of rationality. They are covered by normative theories of rationality, the prominent standard-bearer of which being Expected Utility theory, which is, however, familiar only to few (among the human population, and with only but a fraction of them mastering it).12 Its shortcomings, as an explanatory theory, specifically as part of the traditional conception of a rational economic agent, have been brought out by various experimental results in cognitive psychology.13 So appealing to it as is is not a promising candidate for yielding a fully satisfactory explanatory account of the corresponding cognitive phenomena practiced by virtually all competent cognizers. Expected Utility theory (to be abbreviated as: EU) is a general normative academic theory of the rationality of actions. 
     As noted above and as will be further elaborated below, I will argue that differences regarding intermediate actions, due to different preferred strategies, underscore a large variety of cases, including the formative examples under consideration in this paper. Since interactive transactions by conversational partners at the joint deliberational stage are primarily linguistic and specifically assertorial, we should emphasize that for our purposes certain actions are assertive actions, and speakers face decisions as to whether or not to assert, and if so, what to assert, rendering such decisions assertorial decisions. Such decisions may or may not be rational.14 The rationality of such assertions (actual or potential) amounts to their rational assertibility. Rational assertibility is the first main pragmatic notion I want to appeal to. 
Section 2: Rationality and the heuristics of practical inferences                Since Expected Utility theory is familiar to few, employed by fewer, and even then only a small portion of the time. Since its descriptive adequacy is arguably limited,15 we may well attempt to appeal to decision mechanisms the use of which seems to be prevalent.  In particular, I suggest considering the venerable common-sense doctrine of practical inference as a simple-minded heuristics, pointing to, or suggesting, that we should act in one way or another, and which plays an analogous role to that of expected utility theory regarding decisions. Practical inferences involve, on the one hand, premises, and, on the other, a conclusion that specifies an action, which can be presented in the form: Therefore, do A (or: Therefore, I should do A, where A is some action). Practical inference, however, is a very simple, and indeed simplistic, heuristics, and as such has obvious drawbacks (especially in comparison to the expected utility procedure) - first and foremost, that of ignoring alternative contingencies (as well as being ill-suited for quantitative considerations). 
Some practical inferences are viable (in given circumstances), whereas others are not. One issue that is important in an evaluative account of the practice of practical inference is what qualifies 'p' as an admissible premise in a practical inference (for a speaker at a time): One major aspect of a practical inference's being viable is for its premises to be admissible. We thus need to characterize what a premise in a practical inference must be like in order to be admissible. # 
Cognitive explanations, I argue, are generally superior explanatorily in many respects if in providing them we are in a position to appeal to compliance with internalist rather than externalist norms.16 As a rough-and-ready distinction, internalist norms are more akin to 'recipes' for the agent to follow, where her following it is more under her control and ability to monitor compliance -- unlike externalist norms, which leave greater latitude to the space of strategies available for her attempting to comply with the norm in question, and where the compliance with the norm need not be under the agent's control (or much less so) as well as her ability to verify compliance. Internalist norms make it possible to a much greater degree for the agent to track, or access, the extent to which he complies with the norm. Due to the extra latitude that externalist norms provide for a compliant actions (and credible attempts for such), their predictive power and explanatory force are by-and-large more limited in comparison with internalist norms (vis-à-vis how the agent attempts to comply with the norm).17 
 When a proposed externalist norm is not explicitly codified and publicly inculcated, its explanatory force is even more dubious. Williamson's proposed Knowledge Norm of Assertion (such as: Assert that p only if you know that p) is an externalist norm, since 'know' is an externalist notion (e.g., due to the condition of truth, and typically due to other conditions as well), and is not a publically codified norm.18 An epistemic internalist norm of assertion that I have proposed19 is what I have called the cognitive-epistemic norm of assertion, which runs as follows:
(C-E norm of assertion)      Assert that p only if you are in an epistemic position to 
      take yourself to know p.20 
('C-E' stands for cognitive-epistemic'). That is: Assert that p only if you are in an epistemic position to judge: I know that p. 
    One argument in favor of the normative force of this internalist norm is by appealing to corresponding Moorean-type sentences. Consider the assertion:
(*)   p, even though I don't have sufficient confidence to assert that p.
Asserting (*) is unacceptable. Appealing to the move for explaining the unacceptability of Moorean-type sentences by proposing a norm that explains their unacceptability due its being violated by them, we can appeal to the norm:
(*1)  Assert that p only if you have sufficient confidence to assert that p.21
    Consider now the following assertion:
(**)  p, even though my epistemic grounds for it are insufficient for asserting that p. 
Asserting (**) is unacceptable. The norm that would naturally explain this unacceptability would be:
(**1) Assert that p only if you have sufficient epistemic grounds for asserting that p. 
   And last, consider the assertion:
(***) p, even though my sufficient confidence for asserting that p is inadequately   
   supported by my sufficient epistemic grounds for asserting that p.
Again, since asserting (***) is unacceptable, the norm that would explain this unacceptability would be:
(***1)  Assert that p only if your sufficient confidence for asserting that p is adequately   
    supported by your sufficient epistemic grounds for asserting p. 
   Putting these three norms together, we have:
(****)  Assert that p only if your sufficient confidence for asserting that p is adequately 
   supported by your sufficient epistemic grounds for asserting that p.
    But (****) just codifies what we generally consider to be required for a subject to take herself to know that p (in the first person) -- sufficient confidence adequately 
supported by sufficient epistemic grounds. Hence the above argument points to the normative force of the proposed C-E norm of assertion above. 
Section 3: Admissible premises in a practical inference, and rational assertibility    
The practice of practical inference is sensitive to what admissible premises are vs. ones that are not admissible: Employing ones that are not admissible undermines the viability of the practical inference in question. I argue that the main constraint on an admissible premise in a practical inference is that it be overall assertible by the agent who deliberates and considers pertinent practical inferences or explores a particular practical inference.22 Further: what we intuitively gauge as assertible is overall assertibility, rather than a particular type of assertibility. 
    When engaging in practical inference in private, the rational constraints on assertibility are limited, since there are no repercussions on others for private (silent) assertions. But when there is a joint deliberation, with different agents and their own preferred actions, an important dynamics often takes place: As the different agents jockey towards their preferred actions, they aim at steering their co-decision makers towards particular practical inferences as a way of swaying their co-decision makers towards their preferred action -- the one led to by such a practical inference. In such a case, a major way for them to sway their co-agents towards their preferred action is by suggesting a practical inference that would be acceptable to the co-agents with its conclusion pointing to such an action. For this strategy to be successful, it is typical, and in general more efficacious, for a speaker to make an assertion that one's co-decision makers would find to be an admissible premise (for them) in an impending practical inference that they would find convincing and that leads to the action preferred by the speaker in question. A standard strategy, therefore, for a speaker to guide his co-decision makers towards his preferred action is by asserting what would be likely to be considered by them as an admissible premise 'p' in a practical inference leading to such an action. 
    For this endeavor to be effective, the speaker (the husband, in DeRose's bank example) must be considered by his pertinent audience (and accordingly, typically, would present himself) as being in a position to assert that p, which he aims for his interlocutor (the wife, in that example) to judge as an assertible premise (for her, and thus as an admissible premise by her). Being considered as being in a position to so assert involves two elements. First, the epistemic dimension, requiring typically that the interlocutor consider the speaker as being in an epistemic position to assert that p,23 that is, that the interlocutor would take 'p' as being epistemically assertible by the speaker. (From this vintage point, the interlocutor is typically in a position to acquire epistemic assertibility for herself vis-à-vis 'p', using the speaker as an epistemic source, via a mechanism that also underpins the acquisition of knowledge through testimony.) 
   The second element is the rational dimension: The speaker (the husband, in the bank example) would typically be effective if his interlocutor (his wife, in the bank example) considers the speaker as having in mind and attempting to promote her well-being, or interests, to a sufficiently high degree,24 in asserting that p as a way of promoting 'p' as a premise for her deliberation in a practical inference.  For her to appropriately employ 'p' as a premise in a public deliberation involves a rational aspect that goes beyond 'p''s being privately assertible for her (as in a case where she is isolated): Such a rational aspect arises when such an employment is public (or is likely to be revealed to others), which typically raises the specter of the impact of her asserting that p on her audience. In such a case, the speaker thus needs to be considered by his interlocutor (his co-agent) as bearing in mind the potential impact of his interlocutor's assertion of 'p' as a premise in a practical inference when attempting to induce his interlocutor in the direction of the impending practical inference he is targeting (as well as bearing in mind other repercussions that such an assertion may have over and above its suggested use as a premise).25 The speaker, when sufficiently rational, would have to take into consideration both aspects. If the speaker suggests 'p' as a premise for practical inference to his interlocutor, whom he expects her to follow up by going through the impending practical inference, the speaker would be more efficacious if his interlocutor considers him sufficiently as her 'ally' – as having in mind and attempting to promote her interests, primarily so as not to fail her in steering her towards the action in question (i.e., his preferred action, but also often in inducing her to employ 'p' as a premise publically by endorsing it or asserting it publically). 
    So we may distinguish two types of admissibility regarding employing 'p' as a premise in a practical inference (for an actor – the interlocutor -- at a time). One is its epistemic admissibility, requiring that 'p' be epistemically assertible by the actor. The other is its rational assertibility by the actor. Together (assuming for simplicity no other pertinent normative pressures), they interface so as to yield an outcome regarding the overall assertibility of 'p' by the actor. For a practical inference to be epistemically viable (for the actor), its premises must be epistemically assertible by her (at the time).26 The practical inference itself may or may not be viable overall for the subject, where its overall viability requires, among others, that its premises be overall assertible by the actor (which is the aspect that concerns us here).27 So this is the way that epistemic assertibility figures as a factor in the actor's requisite sensitivity to viability of practical inferences. Competent actors (linguistically as well as rationally and socially) can be expected to have requisite intuitive sensitivity to premises being overall assertible by them, which is what is required for admissible premises.  
Section 4: The steering role of knowledge                Practical inferences give rise to another, quite important in my view, pragmatic phenomenon that I propose to recognize and would like to emphasize – the pragmatic role of knowledge, which I would call the steering role of knowledge. As noted, a natural way for a speaker to steer someone towards performing an action is for him to establish 'p' as an admissible premise (for her), where there is an impending practical inference with 'p' as a premise and with the conclusion pointing to that action, and where the speaker can expect (to one extent of another) the actor to adopt 'p' as a premise in it. So I can steer you towards opening the fridge if I notice that you are hungry and I say: There is food in the fridge. Under quite natural circumstances, there is an impending practical inference with the action of your opening the fridge as a conclusion, and which is led to by an obvious practical inference with 'There is food in the fridge' as a premise, the admissibility of which (for you) is backed up by my assertion. My asserting that p, when 'p' is assertible by me, is a standard way of establishing it as an admissible premise for you,28 in particular when there is an impending practical inference leading from it to a certain action: A typical way for me to steer you towards that action is for me to simply assert that p.  Steering one towards an action is therefore naturally and frequently done by asserting such a premise. Furthermore, asserting the explicit first-person knowledge-ascription 'I know that p' (rather than just asserting 'p') is a standard way of impressing on one's audience a stronger status for 'p' as an appropriate premise (for one's audience) in a practical inference.29 
    This is a major part of the steering role of knowledge, especially in its explicit use, as in asserting 'I know that p'. But this steering role of knowledge is also present implicitly in asserting a simple sentence (as in asserting just 'p', i.e., when 'p' is not in the scope of 'know') due to the knowledge component of an adequate norm of assertion, and in particular in the above cognitive-epistemic norm of assertion.30 Another very important aspect of the steering role of knowledge is that by pressing for the use of 'p' as a premise in a practical inference, one steers one's audience towards ignoring alternative contingencies (to 'p'). Ignoring competing alternatives (to 'p') is a feature of engaging in a practical inference with 'p' as a premise. This aspect comes with a significant price in terms of caution, but also with a considerable benefit in terms of cost (time, energy).31 
Section 5: Explaining the bank example                 With the pragmatic notions, first, of the steering role of knowledge and, second, of rational assertibility, we are in a position to explain the bank example. In the first stage, on Friday, the husband (DeRose in his example) with his wife notices the long line in front of the bank, and he says: Let's delay the deposit to Saturday. His wife retorts: Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday? The husband answers: Yes, I do. (Or, as in the original example, adding: I have seen it open on Saturday two weeks ago.) Then comes the second phase of the example, where the wife reminds her husband of the heavy cost of failing to deposit by Saturday, when the payment on their mortgage is due. At this stage, the husband retracts his previous assertion – his self-knowledge ascription (to the effect that he knows that the bank is open on Saturday).32 
    Note that I have intentionally omitted the second consideration offered by the wife in the original example and variants of it, where she points to an error possibility – in this case, that banks sometimes change their opening hours. I urge that the raising of an error possibility is a distinctly epistemic factor. Raising an error possibility is typically involved in – and often leads to -- epistemic retraction, a phenomenon that should, and can, be kept apart from the phenomenon of pragmatic retraction. It is important to recognize that, as in the above version as I formulated it, retraction is grounded in pragmatic considerations rather than in epistemic information. Epistemic retraction should, and can, be handled in epistemic terms, as I have proposed elsewhere.33 The phenomenon I focus on here involves the wife's informing her husband about a major risk (or about the stakes),34 which, as I argue here, is a pragmatic phenomenon leading to pragmatic retraction. Pragmatic retraction calls for a pragmatic treatment, I argue here, whereas epistemic retraction calls for an epistemic treatment.
   Both phenomena can of course be present, and then superimpose, or only one type of retraction be warranted but not the other. But one may conflate the two cases if there are both epistemic as well as pragmatic inputs. It may be that conflating the two led to the difficulty of recognizing and acknowledging the exclusively pragmatic character of pragmatic retraction, mixing it with epistemic retraction, which contributed to the temptation towards incorporating a pragmatic component in the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascriptions – the tendency towards pragmatic encroachment. This is so since accounting for how the epistemic input contributes to retraction does call for resorting to the truth conditions of knowledge-ascriptions, whereas, I argue, accounting for a mere pragmatic retraction, as in the case I consider here, does not.35
     The husband's first self-knowledge ascription can, in view of the above considerations, be explained as follows: The husband first judges that the right action for them to take is to delay depositing to Saturday. This is an action-oriented decision on his part. He then needs to sway his co-actor, his wife, towards this preferred action of his, since the deliberation in question is aimed at a joint decision, and since the example insinuates that she is inclined towards the other action – of depositing now. He thus moves to an intermediate stage -- preliminary to the point at which a join decision is being settled on: This is an intermediate stage in which he and his wife don't have a shared intermediate goal – which action to take in order to accomplish their ultimate shared goal (of avoiding the heavy penalty of losing their house, associated with defaulting on the deadline).36 Thus, despite having a shared ultimate goal and attempting to cooperate to achieve it, there is the preliminary intermediate stage of jockeying towards a joint intermediate goal: settling on a joint decision regarding when to deposit.37
   This intermediate stage calls, on the husband's part, for a meta-decision – an assertorial decision: What to assert in order to steer his wife towards his preferred action. By asserting 'I know that the bank is open on Saturday' he attempts to establish, and with considerable weight,38 'The bank is open on Saturday' as an admissible premise in a practical inference for his wife, a practical inference that leads to the impending conclusion of 'Delay the deposit to Saturday', which is his preferred action. Given that, asserting 'The bank is open on Saturday', as well as the stronger 'I know that the bank is open on Saturday', are rationally assertible for him – they can be expected by him to promote his preferred intermediate goal of delaying the deposit to Saturday. 
   The steering role of knowledge plays a major role here in the husband's impressing on his wife the admissible status of this premise (for her), and this role is more emphatic when the husband uses 'I know' explicitly. But it would play an important role as well without an explicit use of 'know', due to the pertinent norm of assertion, which invokes knowledge.39 That is, by asserting 'p', the husband projects himself as having overall assertibility for 'p', which is a superposition of epistemic assertibility and rational assertibility (on his part). With his being in an appropriate epistemic and rational position vis-à-vis 'p', as viewed by his wife, and as is projected by his assertion, she would be in a better, and often much better, position to have overall assertibility for 'p' by acquiring it from him once he asserts 'p'.  
    The major change at the second phase is that the husband changes his view about what the preferable action is (in view of being reminded of the high cost of failing to deposit by Saturday). Re-asserting what he has previously asserted would tend to lead his wife once again in the direction of the above practical inference with the impending conclusion of delaying the deposit. But at this stage the husband is interested in steering her towards a different, incompatible, action – that of depositing now. Hence he no longer has overall assertibility for what he has asserted previously: Re-asserting it would not only not be rationally assertible for him at this point, but it would be outright counter-productive from his present perspective. Refraining from re-asserting what he has previously asserted, which amounts to a mild form of retraction (e.g., by him responding: Okay, so let's deposit now), is thus explainable by appealing to the steering role of knowledge in a would-be re-assertion, which would now be counter-productive for him, and thus by appealing to its non-rational assertibility (for him).40 In the first stage, the steering role of knowledge thus interfaces and supplements the main factor of his having then rational assertibility for what he has asserted at that stage, but which he no longer has in the second stage. 
    This type of example can therefore be provided with a purely pragmatic satisfactory explanation, as proposed above, which obviates the purported need to introduce a pragmatic component into the semantics of 'know', and thus trumps the move towards pragmatic encroachment. Note that I have not appealed in the above account to any particular feature of the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascriptions, which renders the account, and therefore this type of example, as largely irrelevant to the semantics of knowledge. 
Section 6: Various norms, intuitive acceptability, intuitive assertibility, and semantic evidence    	                   It's of interest to note a consequence of the discussion above: Philosophical methodology regarding the resort to intuitions should be employed much more carefully than it often is and has been (e.g., in our case, by Stanley and some contextualists, and by philosophers in general, as well as by some linguists). This is so since norms other than linguistic norms such as semantic norms (or Gricean conversational norms) may affect our intuitions one way or another – subverting intuitive acceptability or reinforcing it, as well as promoting overall assertibility or denigrating it -- e.g., by a major weight imposed by rational norms, the phenomenon focused on here. The distinction of different sub-types of assertibility (classified by the type of norms that underpin them – e.g., epistemic assertibility, rational assertibility, and semantic assertibility), as well as the notion of overall assertibility, are also important for the enterprise of scrutinizing evidence for semantic features. Gauging for features such as 'intuitively wrong' or 'seems intuitive' and kindred expressions may easily miss the impact of such norms as interfacing with the impact of semantic norms. Semantic norms are to be protected as the norms that are prominently at play for gauging semantic features.41 (This is so unless the impact of other norms is discounted, which may pose difficulties even if they all weigh in the same direction, but can be very hard to sort out if they push in opposite directions. So the clean setup for testing semantic features is in sterile examples – example that are free of normative forces other then semantic (and syntactic).42 
    Moreover, a clear distinction has to be made between intuitive acceptability – which is relevant to evidence for semantic features, on the one hand,43 and intuitive assertibility, on the other: Prompting for whether there is assertibility by a figure in the example is prone to invoke rational pressures (when there are such – e.g., when it was rational or irrational for him to assert 'p' then) that may have nothing to do with truth conditions: Pressures on the figure (whose assertibility is being gauged) favor her or discourage her from embarking on practical inferences that lead to actions that may be harmful (or beneficial) to the figure in the example (as well as have expected possible impact on listeners), and thus may reflect on whether the assertions under consideration are rational for the decision-maker in a joint deliberation.44
   Thus, assertibility should be recognized as relative to an agent (such as the speaker, or other potential speakers), since different interests of an agent confer exposure to different rational pressures that may operate in same or different directions over and above the epistemic assertibility of 'p' by the agent. What may be assertible for one person (at a time) need not be assertible for another, even if they are in the very same epistemic conditions, if they differ in their preferences or interests,45 which may not only differ but also conflict. So an assertion by one speaker that serves his interest, and thus may be overall assertible for him, may undermine the interests of another speaker if asserted by her, thereby rendering it not overall assertible for her, even if they are in the same conversational context (let alone if not), and even if they are in the same epistemic position. 
   But checking whether an assertion (or a potential assertion) by a figure in the example is 'intuitively right' (or supports related locutions) may easily invoke gauging whether it was assertible by him at the time – with such overall assertibility (or lack of it) reflecting normative pressures other than semantic ones, such as rational pressures.  Considerations regarding assertibility by figures in an example should therefore, in clean, potent examples, be left out when aiming for evidence for semantic features. It is acceptability intuitions by us, the remote audience (who don't figure in the example) or our assertibility, that should be counted -- and even then, only in sufficiently normatively sterilized settings.46 (Distinguish responders outside the setting of the example, such as responders whose intuitions are being gauged, or readers of the example – a remote audience, from 'inside audience' who figure in the example.) Intuitively we can only gauge overall assertibility as opposed to a specific sub-type of assertibility (when more than one type of norms are at play), which reflects the phenomenon of direct cognitive blindness to the origin and the ingredients that feed into our intuitive outputs, or which norms underpin it.47 Therefore, assertibility intuitions should count as semantic evidence only in sufficiently normatively sterilized settings. 
    So checking for lexical intuitions is therefore best conducted in a normatively clean environment, i.e., where there are no major applicable norms at play other than  linguistic and cognitive norms48 (or where such normative pressures are taken into account and discounted accordingly, when this is possible). Intuitions regarding the applicability of expression such as 'is intuitively right', 'seems wrong', 'assertible', or even 'counts as true',49 may thus be misleading, since they may be affected by the presence of normative forces (such as rational pressures) that superimpose on semantic features and yield outcomes that may only partly and indirectly reflect semantic features, thereby potentially mis-reflecting them. ('Intuitively right' or 'intuitively wrong' or 'assertible' tend to invoke a content/act ambiguity: Whether the content asserted was true, as opposed to whether the assertoric act was right qua an act – which can be interpreted instrumentally.) Attempting to track semantic features by gauging responses in terms of such locutions formulated without taking the precautionary sterilizing moves spelled out above is therefore very often a wrong and misleading course for searching for evidence for truth conditions. 
Section 7: The relation between knowledge and action                    Many recognize that there is a strong connection between knowledge and action. For them, myself included, the question is what this connection is. The account provided above offers an answer. We have discussed the practical-inference decision-heuristic in some detail, but also kept an eye on the Expected Utility method. For the application of Expected Utility, knowledge seems not to have significance: On the epistemic side, once the agent's probabilities are taken into account, there is hardly any room left for a further epistemic factor, specifically knowledge, to play any legitimate role.50 
     The standard practical inference decision-method is central to our common-sense frame, whether as a method of inference leading to action – especially in thinking out-loud, as in joint deliberations, or as a way of leading other co-deciders to our preferred actions, or when engaged in retrospectively explaining, or justifying, or merely attempting to reconstruct, our decisions and actions (or those of others). For the employment of the practical inference procedure, knowledge plays a central role, first and foremost in characterizing admissible premises in practical inferences.51 Admissible premises must be assertible, and as such thus must abide by an appropriate norm of assertion. Knowledge plays a central role in such a norm. Overall assertibility is a key constraint on admissible premises, and epistemic assertibility is a key constituent in overall assertibility. According to various forms of the knowledge norm of assertion, knowledge is a key to epistemic assertibility. I have offered (above and elsewhere) the epistemic-cognitive norm of assertion as an (internal) norm for epistemic assertibility. Knowledge plays a major role in the epistemic-cognitive norm of assertion, as well as in Williamson's norm of assertion. In general, and in particular regarding an actor who employs a practical inference, the epistemic-cognitive norm of assertion requires she be is in an epistemic position to take herself to know that p for her to have epistemic assertibility for 'p'.52 
   Second, we saw that knowledge also plays a central pragmatic role -- the steering role of knowledge, which is used to steer actors towards certain practical inferences (and away from considering alternative contingencies). This is another, different role of 'know' vis-à-vis action. The constraints discussed above that knowledge imposes on admissible premises, reflects the role of epistemic assertibility by the actor via an essentially private observance (or the potential thereof) of the appropriate norm of assertion, as well as in its use in joint or public decisions. The steering role of knowledge often comes into full play in joint deliberations (although it can also come into play in private deliberation, whereby an actor can steer herself -- as when she is aware of certain biases, skewed dispositions, or irrational fears or emotions that she may want to protect herself against by pressing herself to use a premise 'p' that is devoid of such distorting effects by using 'I know that p' in her private deliberational monologue).53 #
    There are strong constraints on the admissible use of the practical inference heuristic, which we cannot delve into here. An important constraint is to the effect that, when there are considerable risks (or potential gains), a meta-decision should be employed about which decision method to employ, exploring the possibility of resorting to a more sophisticated decision method than the simplistic practical inference method.54 That is, a rational actor should rationally prefer to use a more sophisticated decision procedure (when feasible) if it becomes apparent that the pertinent risks (or gains) are sufficiently high. (Of course, this depends on circumstantial factors such as how much time he has, which also impinge on the meta-decision which decision- method to opt for, or on another meta-decision as to whether gathering further information is feasible and called for.)55 Another important constraint on the practical inference decision-method is that it is unsuitable for quantitative decisions – ones that involve quantitative considerations.56 
    When the practical inference is not admissibly employable, one must resort, when possible, to a more sophisticated decision-method – one that approaches, to one extent or another, EU theory. Then one enters the realm of practical reasoning, which I take to cover practical inference as a specific sub-case. Practical inference is thus a sub-heuristic in practical reasoning (by contrast to EU theory, which is not a mere heuristic, strictly speaking – it is not a rule-of-thumb, unlike practical inference). I take stricter practical reasoning to exclude simple practical inference,57 but to cover various weakenings of EU – from the strict form of EU theory itself all the way down, but only up to the practical inference heuristic. Stricter practical reasoning allows for premises that involve probabilities, quantities, utilities, etc. -- various ingredients that enter into full-fledged EU considerations, whether or not they are watered-down to one extent or another. 
    Practical reasoning may well be presented in a practical inference form, i.e., as an inference with premises that are to be asserted and a conclusion specifying an action to be taken. But the practical inference heuristic is characterized by more than having a practical inference form: It involves simple, factual premises58 and doesn't make room for quantitative or probabilistic features, thereby reflecting the simple, straightforward usefulness of the practical inference heuristic – together with its limitations and disadvantages.59 Practical inference, I argue, is a central building block of common-sense, as is knowledge, and in view of that, the proper connection between action and knowledge is to be found at the common-sense level, and specifically in the role that knowledge plays in the practical inference heuristic, though not in the normative, sophisticated but relatively arcane (viz., relative to the bulk of the human race) strict form of EU theory and its elk, where action is of course central, but where 'know' plays little if any role.
Section 8: A counter-example to SSI and contextualism			
Section 8.1: DeRose's and Stanley's proposals        	  I shall now present a counter-example aim at two targets: Contextualism (specifically, DeRose's version), and Stanley's Subject-Sensitive Invariantism.60 The example would be a variation on DeRose's bank case.
   On DeRose's account, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions depend on the context of the ascriber, and specifically on a feature of that context, which is the standard at that context.61 For DeRose, the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions in a particular ascriptional context depend on the comparative levels of the subject's epistemic position and the standard of the ascriber's context: For a knowledge ascription to count as true at such a context, the subject's epistemic position must be significantly higher than the standard at the ascriptional context.62 The ascriptional context (leaving skeptical contexts out) and its standard would tend to vary with the importance, or stakes, that the ascriber takes the case to have.63 
    Thus, in DeRose's seminal bank case, the husband, in the first part of the example (before his wife mentions the importance of a timely deposit), says 'I know that the bank is open on Saturday', which DeRose takes to count as true at that context. In the second stage, the husband retracts, and on DeRose's formulation he says at that stage that he doesn't know that the bank is open on Saturday, which DeRose again takes to count as true at that second context. This view of these two responses64 has evoked considerable consent. Stanley would take these responses to be 'intuitively right'.65  
   DeRose's main point of accounting for these intuitions is to propose his above schema for truth conditions for knowledge ascriptions, according to which the knowledge ascription in question counts as true at the ascriptional context in case, roughly, the epistemic position of the subject is significantly higher than the standard at that context. In this example, the husband's epistemic position is roughly medium-high in both stages, whereas the standard of the context is low in the first stage, but high in the second stage. Consequently, the first self-knowledge ascription by the husband comes out as counting as true in the first stage, whereas his denial comes out as true in the second context. This fits an intuitive reaction whereby the husband's response at the first stage counts as true (to use DeRose's expression), whereas his denial of the knowledge ascription in question in the second stage counts as false.   
   On Stanley's SSI account (supported, at least in spirit, it seems, by Hawthorne),66 the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions don't invoke context-dependence, but invoke the stakes of the subject regarding the proposition in question (specified by the content clause of the knowledge ascription in question).67 For the knowledge ascription to be true, the subject's epistemic position must be significantly higher than those stakes. DeRose's bank example exhibits low stakes in the first stage, and high stakes in the second stage.68 Accordingly, the intuition that the husband knows in the first stage but doesn't know in the second stage (reflected in our assent to the husband's responses in both cases – where they would count as 'intuitively right') is backed up by his fixed medium-high epistemic position regarding the proposition in question (that the bank is open on Saturday), with the stakes being low first and high later.
Section 8.2: The counter-example             On the counter-example I propose, which is a variant on the bank case, the participants are the husband (a counterpart of DeRose in his own example), myself and my friend. It can be carved out into three stages. The first and second stages track DeRose's example. The three of us are in the car, with DeRose driving, on the way to the airport, on a Friday. The plan is for DeRose to deposit a check at his bank, which is on the way to the airport, and for him then to drop me and my friend at the airport. We notice the long line at the bank. I suggest to DeRose that he postpones the deposit for Saturday. DeRose then asks me: "Do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?" I respond: "Yes, it is open on Saturday." (In the original example, the husband response is more explicit, such as: "Yes, I do, it's open on Saturday"v– explicitly (even if anaphorically) asserting that he knows; or outright: "Yes, I know it's open on Saturday". Either formulation would do.69)
   In the second stage, DeRose proceeds to explain the importance of the timely deposit of the check, pointing out that the following day (Saturday) is the deadline for the deposit. He then asks me again: "So do you know that the bank is open on Saturday?" I now respond by saying: "In this case, I don't know that it's open on Saturday. Why won't you then stop at the bank now and deposit."70 
    While I am talking, DeRose's cell phone rings. DeRose takes the call, realizes it's a private call, stops the car, and steps out (closing the door) to proceed privately with the call. Before he steps out, he mentions that he must attend to the call, and that we will resolve the deposit matter when he returns.
    Now comes the third stage (with no parallel in DeRose's original example). My friend, I notice, although very sympathetic to DeRose concern about his house, as I am, is more concerned than me about getting to the airport in time. He approaches me and says: "I don't understand. First you asserted that the bank is open on Saturday, then you took it back. But DeRose didn't give you any evidence one way or another regarding this matter. So why did you change your mind? Do you or don't you know that the bank is open on Saturday?" Throughout our exchange, DeRose is out of range and can't hear us. I respond: "Yes, the bank is open on Saturday. But I was concerned that if I didn't retract, DeRose might proceed to the airport, planning to deposit the check on Saturday. I share completely DeRose's worry about his house, I didn't want DeRose to take the risk, nor do I want to take responsibility for a very bad outcome, and so I wanted DeRose to stop and make the deposit. This is why I retracted." 
   At this point, DeRose is finished with his call, comes back to the car, and says: "Sorry about that. Due to the call, I was distracted while you answered my question. So let's now make a decision when to deposit the check. Can you (aiming at me) repeat what you said?" I repeat my retraction, and DeRose says: "So then let us do as you suggest, and deposit the check now." 
Section 8.3: The upshot of the counter-example              The first two stages in my example and DeRose's example are structurally the same vis-à-vis the parameters dear to DeRose and Stanly – the subject's epistemic position, the standard at the ascriber's context, and the subject's stakes. So I take it that my responses in the first and second stage are no less intuitive than the husband's responses in DeRose's original example. DeRose would take them to count as true at the contexts in question, and Stanley would take them to be intuitively right, as well as intuitively true. My assertion to my friend, in the third stage, to the effect that the bank is open on Saturday, is also quite intuitive – it is intuitively right, and similarly counts as true at that context (at which both my friend and I sympathize with DeRose and are aware of the high risk).  Yet, considering Stanley, the stakes for me (the subject of the self-knowledge ascription) haven't changed from the second to the third stage: DeRose's being able to retain his house has remained important for me, out of my sympathy and care for DeRose, and to the same extent in both stages. So my stakes in the matter have hardly changed. Nor has my epistemic position regarding the proposition in question changed – I have not been provided with any additional evidence regarding the bank's opening hours. With these two features remaining the same, the truth value of the knowledge ascription in the third stage comes out as false due to the high stakes but only medium-high epistemic position, whereas my retracting assertion in the second stage, whose content is the negation of the knowledge ascription in the third stage (and the first stage), comes out as true, on Stanley's account.71 It is generally agreed that in cases like my response to DeRose in the second stage, my retracting response then is intuitively right, as Stanley recognizes. So on Stanley's account, my response in the second stage (retracting my self-knowledge ascription) comes out as true, which is intuitively right, whereas my response in the third stage comes out as false, since at that third stage I assert that the bank is open on Saturday, whereas my stakes (regarding that proposition) remain high and my epistemic position remains medium high. But intuitively, my assertion in the third stage is right – entirely acceptable. So the intuitive outcome of my assertion in the third stage yields the opposite result than what is predicted by Stanley's account.
    Regarding DeRose's account, the standard of the context in the third stage remains high: It was, as DeRose argued, high in the second stage (the second stage in our example here being a mirror image of DeRose's second stage of his own original version). But the features that drove it to be high in the second stage remain intact in the third stage: My empathy and identification with DeRose and the fate of his house have not changed one bit from the second to the third stage, and thus the importance of this concern has not changed for me (and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for my friend). Similarly, my epistemic position (as the self-ascriber) in the third stage regarding whether the bank is open on Saturday has not changed one bit from the second to the third stage – no evidence has been added, and none lost. Hence, since, on DeRose's account, my denial (of the self-knowledge ascription) in the second stage counts as true, my re-assertion of my knowledge claim that the bank is open on Saturday in the third stage should come out as counting as false. But my self ascription of the knowledge claim in the third stage intuitively counts as true at that context. Hence, this case comes out as a counter-example to DeRose's and Stanley's accounts of the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascriptions. 
Section 8.4: Objections                Is the context in the third stage the same context as in the second stage? The only potential difference between the two stages is the departure of DeRose from the conversation. Yet there is no reason in general to assume that any departure of one party to a three-party conversation changes the conversational context. What if a party doesn't depart, but becomes distracted, and doesn't attend to the conversation? Yet the more weighty response is that the pertinent features of the context at the third stage, regardless of how the above issue is resolved, yield the outcome that, on DeRose's account, my affirmation that the bank is open on Saturday doesn't count as true at that context since the standard remains high – it doesn't change significantly between the second and third context, nor has my epistemic position changed. Hence the counter-example holds.
    Regarding Stanley's account: Does the third stage count as a deliberational setting?72 The example above was constructed so that the joint decision hasn't been made until DeRose returns to the car and resumes the discussion. The deliberational setting therefore doesn't end with his departure from the car to take the call. Further, the third stage is still in a deliberational setting, since my friend's question should be construed as challenging, to a certain extent, my suggestion that we stop at the bank: He is more concerned than I am about the delay in arriving at the airport. The intuitions associated with my response to DeRose in the second stage or to my friend in the third stage aren't affected if my friend's query to me regarding my having changed my mind also has the thrust of being a challenge to my position regarding the impending joint decision. My friend may well be less inclined to oppose stopping at the bank (being afraid that we miss our flight) than I am, and may align his challenge to me to reflect such a position, e.g., by saying: "Why did you change your mind? Aren't you concerned about our flight?" Such a modified response wouldn't affect the intuitive status of my response to him, but would keep the deliberational setting explicitly open. 
    So the example more explicitly and emphatically retains its deliberational and high-standard character of this third stage once we are reminded that my friend is, after all, a party to the deliberational process: Even though in the example, as specified, he barely takes part in the deliberational exchanges, his opinion counts, even though he hasn't been asked explicitly.73 So his having an impact on the final decision makes the third conversational interactional stage a part of the joint deliberation, while retaining a high standard and high stakes as well. But since I, in the example, expect that my friend would concur with my reasoning, in particular since he doesn’t offer explicit disagreement, I don’t take it to be necessary for me to employ rational weights of significant extent in my exchange with him in the third stage, and can play with 'open cards' with him, as I do.64 
Section 8.5: Analysis			I have argued in this paper that the bank example and variants of it don't reflect on the truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions but rather on the overall assertibility of the husband's responses in the first and second stages. I have argued that rational assertibility enters the picture on the husband's part in both stages, and to a considerable extent, and that it can interface with semantic/epistemic assertibility in either strengthening or undermining overall assertibility, in each stage, respectively – and it is this element that underpins our intuitions in this case. The husband's response in the first stage in DeRose's example (as in my response at that stage in the proposed variation of mine under consideration here) are driven both by epistemic assertibility as well as by rational/pragmatic assertibility, which are aligned at that stage. At the second stage, the direction of rational assertibility is reversed, and its force overrides the weight of the semantic/epistemic component, yielding that there is no longer overall assertibility to the assertion 'The bank is open on Saturday', whereas in the first stage it reinforced the semantic/epistemic assertibility of the that assertion-type at that stage.
   The same holds in my variant above. What changed in the third stage of that example is the lack of causal impact of my assertion at that stage (to the effect that the bank is open on Saturday)75 on DeRose, since he is out of the car. The fact that DeRose doesn't hear my response to my friend yields that there are no rational/pragmatic repercussions of my assertion on him, and thus not on the impending decision (since the decision is being made jointly, more or less, by DeRose and myself).76 The point of the rational force in the first stage is to drive DeRose to delay the deposit, whereas the point of it in reversing the knowledge ascription in the second stage is to drive him to deposit now: Affecting his deliberative state is at the focus of the rational forces that drive my responses in the first and second stages. But in the third stage, he is absent, and so my assertions are causally inefficacious regarding his state of mind vis-à-vis the impending decision, and hence no rational pressures on my part are called for at that third stage. (I expect with high enough confidence my friend to follow my reasoning, which allows me to play with open cards with him at the third stage.)  
   The semantic and epistemic features indeed haven't change between the second and third stages, nor have the standard or the stakes. What has changed radically, therefore, is the rational assertibility of my assertion in the third stage, in comparison to the second, since there are hardly any counter-productive repercussions of my assertion at the third stage on the impending decision as there would be were I to stand by my original assertion (of the first stage) in the second stage.77 This counter-example therefore brings out that what underpins the intuitions in this case and its kin are changes in rational aspects, specifically rational/pragmatic repercussions, which strongly affect assertibility, overshadowing the semantic and epistemic features, which don't vary throughout the example. This example thus weighs in in favor of the position that I have argued for -- that this type of example reflects primarily pragmatic/rational features regarding overall assertibility which underpin the intuitions that it yields, rather than illuminating semantic features of knowledge-ascriptions. 















1. The knowledge ascriptions in question may be made by a figure in the example, or when an example or an actual case in point are presented, by a respondent, prompted for her intuition.
   Contextualism has had as a major goal a treatment of skepticism, which is outside the scope of this paper. So a fair comparison between the account offered here and contextualism would require either undermining the contextualist treatment or offering a better account. For an invariantist treatment of soft skepticism that I offered, see "From Knowledge as Indicativity to Perceptual Invariantism " (manuscript); for an invariantist treatment of hard-core skepticism, see my "Knowledge as Indicativity and Hard-Core Skepticism" (manuscript).
2. See Keith DeRose, "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context" philosophical Review, 2002; Philosopher’s Annual, vol. 26. DeRose posed it as a challenge for a successful WAM if it is to handle successfully cases such as the bank example. 
3. Such as 'sure'.
4. See my "No Pragmatic Encroachment for 'Know': Its Steering Role in Practical Inference" (manuscript).
5. It thus avoids DeRose's charge against what he called WAMs (warranted assertibility maneuvers) – the ones familiar to him at the time, which he considered unsuccessful in failing the requirement of generality. The issue of whether the account presented here counts as a WAM requires more space than I can devote to it here; see my "No Pragmatic Encroachment for 'Know': Its Steering Role and Practical Inference" (manuscript). 
6. In this paper I will not delve into Stanley's examples, but I analyze them in detail elsewhere; see "Overall Assertibility and Conflicting Normative Pressures" (manuscript). 
7. This use reflects to a considerable extent Stanley's usage (but also DeRose's in "Knowledge, Assertion, and Context"); I address DeRose's contextualist formulation of 'counting as true' in "Stakes, Knowledge, and Rational Assertibility" (manuscript), arguing that the considerations and analysis appealed to here apply to his formulation as well (although to a lesser extent). 
8. That is, in terms of norms applicable to the case; I expand on some norms below. 
9. Intuitive acceptability is weaker, and different in other respects, than assertibility. First, intuitive acceptability is primarily a matter of a private judgment, and thus does not require taking into account audience's reactions, unlike public assertibility. Second, 'p''s being intuitively acceptable by me is weaker than it's being assertible by me: Finding 'p' to be intuitively acceptable would incline me to believe that p, but need not be enough to put me in a position to assert that p – even privately.
10. For more on other normative contributions, see my "Assertorial Decisions, Practical Inference, and Heuristics of Deciding" (manuscript).  
11. Or at least where there is a presumption that this is the case.
12. Expected Utility theory has been subject to various criticisms in the literature, in particular regarding its descriptive adequacy -- its shortcomings as a candidate for being depicted as an actual cognitive mechanism, and especially as part of the conception of rationality in classical Economics. Yet simple heuristics that approximate it to various degrees may be called for, and among them is that of practical inference, which I will focus on here, and other variations, on which I elaborate in "Assertorial Decisions, Practical Inference, and Heuristics of Deciding" (manuscript). Expected utility theory, conceived as first and foremost a normative theory, doesn't pretend as such to reflect human cognition accurately vis-à-vis decision making. Descriptive empirical deficiencies are prone to be more convincing at the presence of more adequate cognitive models, but, when the latter are not resorted to, such formal artifactual models, e.g., as in game theory, may have been, and may still be, a normatively viable way we can go by, despite their descriptive limitations, if we are guided by a conception of rationality.
13. See http://gilkalai.wordpress.com/2008/05/14/rationality-economics-and-games/ (​http:​/​​/​gilkalai.wordpress.com​/​2008​/​05​/​14​/​rationality-economics-and-games​/​" \t "_blank​).

Specifically, the conception of rationality reflected in the traditional picture in Economics has been severely criticized, if not outright undermined, by the works of Tversky and Kahaneman, giving rise to the burgeoning field of experimental economics, reflecting specifically how subjects fail to adhere to the traditional conception of rationality, in which Expected Utility theory has figured prominently. Deficiencies of Expected Utility theory, to varying degrees, when applied for explanations of actual (or hypothetical) phenomena, have been pointed out convincingly (although massive attempts to use it for explanatory purposes have been widely spread for many years in the literature, e.g., in theoretical Economics). Kahaneman and Tversky offered their Prospect Theory as an alternative empirical rival to Expected Utility theory (with important different phenomena reflected in the two – e.g., risk aversion).
14. Yet, as will be obvious below, since there is in general a variety of applicable norms, there is no such thing as the norm of assertion. Williamson may have aimed at a Gricean/epistemic norm of assertion, where the latter governs epistemic assertibility. Yet one may well consider overall assertibility, which is governed in general by a variety of interfacing norms. But again, since there is no publically codified norm of this sort, and due to various normative forces that may be at play, there is hardly room to call a given norm the norm of assertion. (The imputed status of what I call here and elsewhere 'the cognitive (or cognitive-epistemic) norm of assertion' is that of an internalist norm, which may be also considered under the methodology of a simulation model.) 
    For more on Gricean maxims in relation to rational assertibility, see my "No Pragmatic Encroachment for 'Know': Its Steering Role and Practical Inference" (manuscript); Duncan Pritchard, "Contextualism, Skepticism and Warranted Assertibility Maneuvres", Knowledge and Skepticism, (eds.) J. Keim-Campbell, M. O’Rourke & H. Silverstein, (MIT Press, 2005); and Jessica Brown, "Contextualism and Warranted Assertibility Manoeuvres", Philosophical Studies, 130:407-435, 2006.  
15. Tversky and Kahaneman persuasively argued again the conception of rationality that underpinned classical economic theory, and in particular against Expected Utility theory, offering Prospect Theory as a preferable descriptive account.
16. Very roughly, the subject largely has access to whether she complies with an internal norm, and complying with it is largely under her control – unlike the case with external norms. Compare the point made here regarding explanation to the debate about broad vs. narrow psychological explanations, vis-à-vis not broad vs. narrow content but regarding the employment of true de dicto ascriptions of the actor's pertinent psychological attitudes (whether or not they are also true de re) vs. ascriptions which are only true de re (but are not true de dicto). The former characterizes such psychological states of the actor more or less (subject to adequate paraphrasability) as she represents them to herself, whereas the latter may employs singular terms (and even predicates) that she wouldn't use and even ones she is unfamiliar with – and especially singular terms that she is not aware that have the same designation as the terms she would or does use. (There are two contexts and circumstances involved here – the context and circumstances of the subject at the time, and of the ascriber – the one providing the explanation, typically at a later time.) Broad explanations may fail to yield valid inferences without specification of appropriate co-designation in the premises and the conclusion if, e.g., the ascriber uses one singular term in one premise while he uses another – which is co-referential for him at the time of ascription to the first – in the conclusion (or in a different premise), and accordingly in general need not mirror an inference employed by the subject. But even if the inferences are valid, narrow explanations (in this sense) provide a more loyal reflection of the actor's mode of functioning if they are more loyal to the way she represents, e.g., pertinent objects, by tracking more loyally in her reasoning. In this respect, they provide better explanations. (Of course, in various cases the ascriber – the one providing the explanation -- may not have access to how the actor represents, e.g., the objects in question, in which case he may not be able to provide superior narrower explanations.) (See my "Beliefs and Believing", Theoria, LII, 3, pp 129-145, 1986.) (​http:​/​​/​www.st-andrews.ac.uk​/​philosophy​/​docs​/​staff​/​jab30​/​doubt_circularity.pdf​)
17. This point may well have lesser force in case of publically encoded external norms, inculcated by the general public, such as standard moral norms (e.g.: Don't murder), or very well-known legal norms. But we deal here with assertoric practices for which there are no publically encoded norms. Whether a norm is internal or external comes in degrees – one norm may be much more internal than another, even if compliance with it is not entirely under the subject's control, or not entirely with the subject's having full access regarding how well she complies with it. So the contrast I focus on here is between relatively (or by-and-large) internal vs. relatively (or by-and-large) external norms.
   Moreover, it is an empirical question when our attempts to comply normatively are conducted by way of following an internalized (internal) norm or whether all we have available to us is an external norm. (It may be that we have internalized a public, external norm, or that we have internalized the normative constraints by way of either an internal or an external conceptualization.) The strategy of coming up with cognitive simulation models regarding cognitive phenomena, which is the mode of philosophical analysis that I advocate, may well veer towards attempting to find an internal norm for which there is evidential support (or even which seems viable, given available empirical evidence), and employ it by way of providing a cognitive simulatory explanation.
18. E.g., the notion of a defeater, which is largely an externalist notion, as well as aspects of notions such as reliability, counterfactuals, indicativity, being positioned in a certain situation, and others. The prime examples of publically codified norms are legal norms and often ethical norms. 
19. I emphasize that the norm is epistemic, specifically to demarcate it from Gricean-pragmatic norms, or from rational-pragmatic norms.
20. For a more elaborate discussion of the cognitive norm of assertion and its advantages vis-à-vis Williamson's knowledge norm of assertion, see my "The Cognitive norm of Assertion" and "From Knowledge as Indicativity to Perceptual Invariantism" (manuscripts). There I discuss also other proposals for norms of assertion, e.g. Douven's and Lackey's.
21. Such a move as an argument for postulating norms is, by itself, deficient, unless supplemented in a certain way. It can be so supplemented, yet I will not enter this complication here; but see my "The Cognitive Norm of Assertion" (manuscript).
22. Admissible for her (and thus assertible for her): In joint deliberations, the premise need not be assertible by others, including us, the readers (the audience). The assertibility in question is overall assertibility – taking into account various sub-types of assertibility, e.g., epistemic assertibility and rational assertibility. A practical inference's being viable is thus relative – in particular, to a particular deliberator. In joint deliberation cases there is more than one deliberator, and they may vary in what they are in a position to consider as an admissible premise in the practical inference under consideration in the circumstances. (It can also be relative to us, the audience – see below). Overall assertibility is what we sense intuitively, directly (in view of the opaqueness of the forces of particular norms that are at play – see below).
23. Yet to consider 'p' as overall assertible by the interlocutor requires that she considers 'p' as rationally assertible and sufficiently epistemically assertible – which may fall short of full-fledged epistemic assertibility.
24. The actor's interest, when engaging in the practical inference out-loud, as in an assertoric form, can be viewed narrowly or broadly. Narrowly, they would involve the effect on other co-actors, if there are such, regarding the outcome of the joint deliberation. More broadly, they would involve repercussions of her making such assertions, or the very inference, on the present audience, and perhaps on others who may be informed of her assertions.
25. The first would involve the impact on other potential co-agents vis-à-vis the prospect of settling on the speaker's preferred action as their preferred action as well. The latter may involve a variety of other impacts – such as the impact on the other co-agents that goes beyond the deliberation in question, as well as impact on others who may hear or learn about the interlocutor assertion.
26. Whether publically, as in a joint deliberation case, or privately. 
27. Overall assertibility involves superimposing various pertinent assertibility dimensions – in our case, primarily epistemic assertibility and rational assertibility. Sometimes overall assertibility of a premise may allow for the premise in question to fall short of epistemic assertibility, although normally not by much, if there are strong rational pressures in its favor; see my "Overall Assertibility and Conflicting Normative Pressures" (manuscript). Overall viability of a practical inference requires more than the admissibility of the premises, e.g., its ampliative appropriate validity (and compliance with requisite constraints, such as ones mentioned here and elsewhere; see my "No Pragmatic Encroachment for 'Know': Its Steering Role in Practical Inferences" (manuscript)).
28. Within certain constraints, of course.
29. My epistemic assertibility, as the assertor, depends on how well acquainted you are with me and how I am, and have been, positioned. My rational assertibility depends on whether you would take me to be prone to lead you astray by my assertion – e.g., if the food is rotten, etc. Apart from impact on audience, present or remote, rational aspects involve also potential side effects of the action I am steering you towards, which need not involve an impact of your assertion. 
30. Compare DeRose's Generality Objection to contextualism, which he addresses by resorting to Williamson's knowledge norm of assertion.
31. A simplistic aspect of the practical inference heuristics lies also in considering only one action (or avoiding taking that action) without considering comparatively various alternative actions. This is an asset in terms of saving time and effort, but it compromises optimal decision-making.
32. Retraction can come in various forms and various strengths; see my "From Knowledge as Indicativity to Perceptual Invariantism" (manuscript). 
33. See my "From Knowledge as Indicativity to Perceptual Invariantism".
34. One should bear in mind that high stakes involve not only risks but also prospects for major potential gain, an angle neglected in much of the literature.
35. I ignore here the element of the standard version of the example where an error possibility is being pointed out, since it's not central to our purpose in this essay, which is the impact of pragmatic considerations, such as risk considerations rather than of error possibilities (I deal with soft skepticism and error possibilities in my "From Knowledge as Indicativity to Perceptual Invariantism".) Whereas the cost dimension (say, stakes) in the version I focus on calls, on my view, for a pragmatic treatment, which I offer here, the error possibility dimension is not a pragmatic phenomenon, requires, I argue, no pragmatic treatment, and can be handled adequately in terms of the Indicativity analysis of knowledge that I proposed (and thus requires, indeed, an appeal to the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascriptions). I am aware that this error-possibility version has been focused on by authors such as Rissue, Brown, Schiffer, and others. I consider it confusing to mix it together with the risk factor, as they and others do, since this is an epistemic dimension that needs indeed to be handled in epistemic terms, whereas the risk dimension is a pragmatic dimension, for which I offer a pragmatic treatment here. 
36. The ultimate shared goal is, presumably, holding on to their house, avoiding a huge penalty, and not standing in a long line – though the example leaves it open whether the husband and wife gives the same weights to the latter component of their ultimate goal. Realistically, in cases of this sort, different people would vary, to one extent or another, regarding the relative weight they would assign to each component.
37. Note that the difference in their positions in the first stage regarding the intermediate goals (of when to deposit) undermines the Gricean rationale for employing his maxims. Full cooperation towards shared goals is the rationale. But if different actors opt for different strategies, they typically would differ regarding intermediate goals called for by the different strategies, thereby undermining full sharing of goals: Even while sharing ultimate goals, differing with respect to intermediate goals may well lead to such jockeying and attempts to steer one's co-actors via conversational exchanges that figure in the attempt to reach a joint decision – the decision regarding the intermediate goal.  
38. Due to the explicit use of 'I know'.  
39. The cognitive-epistemic norm of assertion, backed up by the husband's credibility as someone who attends to his wife's interest (which in this case he shares), lends credence to the overall assertibility of this premise for her, on the basis of his assertion, which adds weight in favor of her adopting it as a premise in her deliberation. The wife would tend, in such a case, to acquire epistemic assertibility from her husband if he has it, and may well be disposed to acquire overall assertibility from him, reflecting the acquisition of sufficient rational assertibility as well as sufficient epistemic assertibility.
40. And consequently, its non overall assertibility.
41. And thus, that should not be overridden or compensated for by other norms. Syntactic norms should always be satisfied as well, but overall assertibility for a syntactically correct formulation may be acquired from a speaker whose formulation is syntactically faulty to a certain extent when it succeeds in conveying the message attempted to be communicated. The same holds for semantic assertibility -- some forms of syntactic and/or semantic error need not undermine comprehension.
   Semantic norms operate on the information available to the responder – the one whose intuitions are being gauged. So the output of the responder's semantic norms is produced modulo that information. Negligence in adhering to information recounted in philosophical examples reflects violation of cognitive norms, as does negligence in processing the concepts in question (specifically, 'know') given the information the responder possesses. Of course, intuitions regarding truth values may be distorted by epistemic violations – inappropriate employments of epistemic norms. Indeed, cases with 'material' epistemic violations or cognitive negligence that twist pertinent outputs of intuitive acceptability are indeed not among the type of cases where semantic norms are reflected without interference in a way that provides adequate evidence for semantic features, and should be either avoided (or 'fixed') in order to obtain adequate evidence for semantic features. 
42. The point made here is not the point that such intuitions prove to be more controversial than proponents of pragmatic encroachment, in particular, Stanley, have anticipated, or the point that probabilities we assign to scenarios are affected once we are aware that they are riskier than we anticipated, which may indeed in turn lower the probability assigned by a responder to a pertinent belief (and the scenario, or contingency, it depicts) -- even when in appropriately so, and even to a level below the knowledge threshold, thereby undermining outputs regarding knowledge ascriptions (such as epistemic assertibility). The point I make here concerns the interference, or 'noise', generated by non-lexical norms, most prominently rational norms, that affect acceptability intuitions.
43. Intuitive acceptability should be checked primarily privately when used for gauging semantic features, as opposed to public responses, which may be impacted by rational pressures vis-à-vis possible expected impact by the responder's answer on the responder's audience. Compare to the type of initial tests performed by Stich and others on students, especially when not anonymous, vis-à-vis potential expected impact of their responses on their professor, or to the pressure to aim at answers he would consider right even if the tests are anonymous.
44. Impact on the responders is not a point we have dwelled on, and is pertinent only when the case presented is taken to be actual by the responder and with impact on them. That the response of an audience reflects its judgment about the rationality of an action of figure in the example encouraged, or pushed, by assertions of the same or other figures, or by hypothetical utterances, and that it overrides sympathies or antipathies by the audience, is an important point vis-à-vis the role of audiences as rational advisors that I expand on in "The Vicarious Role of Audience as Right/Rational Advisors".    
45. Whether their interests are actual (or objective), or merely perceived (by the subject, or subjective), or both. This distinction between actual and perceived interests calls for another refinement of the notion of assertibility by a speaker vis-à-vis such differences, along the lines of a sub-distinction of rational assertibility to two sub-types: internal – appealing to the speaker's perceived interests, and external – appealing to her (actual) interests as we, the readers, take them to be. I will not pursue it here, except for noting that what the speaker's interest are may be considered from her perspective – that is, internally, as she takes them to be, or from our perspective – we, the readers. We the readers may in certain cases end up being mistaken about what the speaker's interest are, and thus our intuitive response about whether 'p' is assertible by her (from our perspective) is therefore defeasible, opening the road to another sub-type of assertibility, appealing to 'objective' interests.
46. Thus, in view of my claim that audiences, when responding as vicarious participants, act as rational advisors, measures should be taken to distance them from playing this role in order to gauge for evidence for semantic features. This is not to say that examples that fail the conditions I specify here as desirable conditions for checking semantic features do not reflect such features, to one extent or another. But the presence of additional forces constitute 'noises' that must be discounted in order to extract the semantic force, and this need not be, and often isn't, easy at all (as when the semantic pressures, on the hand one, and other pressures, on the other, operate in opposite directions). But note that even if semantic and other pressures operate in the same direction, one has to be able to tell whether the semantic force has sufficient impact, as opposed to being too small, or even negligible, since in the latter case the example may not be adequate for assertibility intuitions to provide clear semantic evidence. (In general, when normative pressures other than linguistic ones are not at play, assertibility intuitions (for us as assertors) differ from our acceptability intuitions by having a higher threshold: Acceptability intuitions seem to be aligned via the threshold adequate for having a warranted belief, whereas assertibility intuitions gauge the threshold characteristic of knowledge ascriptions – another connection between assertion and knowledge, reflected in variants of knowledge norms of assertion.) 
    In this and the previous note I appealed to us, the readers of a written example, or us as the audience for an example presented verbally. Although I don't have the space to develop this area more, our role as audience is crucial in various respects, since, I argue elsewhere, we the audience often play a vicarious role as conversational participants, and such a role guides our assertibility intuitions (regarding what we are willing to assert). This yields an important potential distortion in employing intuitions about what is assertible by us as evidence for semantic features (let alone what is assertible by actors in the example). For a fuller account of this interesting phenomenon, see my "The Vicarious Role of Audience, Distortions of Intuitions, and Pragmatic Inconsistencies".  .  
47. Scrutiny and reflection may overcome such direct cognitive blindness.
48. By 'linguistic' I exclude pragmatic factors such as Gricean factors. Discounting for Gricean factors has been generally observed by careful writers on the subject. Cognitive norms, as I use the term, govern the proper employment of our linguistic competence (as opposed to sloppy, or negligent, employment, as when the responder is rushed, distracted, drugged, etc.). Usually, examples of the sort under consideration here don't invoke violations of epistemic norms, and in such cases, epistemic norms can be set aside, which is why I did not mention them explicitly. 
49. Whether ''p' counts as true' may differ for different conversational participants even in the same context, depending on their interests and goals (goals may be what the subject takes to be her interests). Some may count it as true, while others not (even if the context is not 'divided', i.e., where contextual features are contested and in competition by different conversational participants). Yet stronger rational pressures are required in order to overrule semantic features in counting 'p' as false (which is DeRose's favorite locution) than in declaring it as 'intuitively wrong' (which is a favorite locution of Stanley's). But semantic features can be overruled under sufficient rational pressures – even though to a bounded, limited extent.
50. Illegitimately (from an epistemic viewpoint), high risks in fact play a role in raising the subjective probabilities for risky contingencies.
   I side-step here issues regarding whether epistemic probabilities rather than subjective probabilities should be employed in EU theory, and whether the former are known by the subject. 
51. I distinguish standard practical inferences, which are discussed here, from a weaker form and a stronger form of practical inferences. The weaker form involves 'I believe that …' as a prefix in the premises of the practical inference. The stronger form is applicable when there is a significant risk involved (i.e., vis-à-vis an alternative contingency to the action specified in the conclusion of the practical inference). I do not pursue here these extensions of the standard practical inference heuristics to its weak and strong form. For such an extension, see "No Pragmatic Encroachment for 'Know': Its Steering Role in Practical Inference", in particular the sections: "The Weak Form of the Practical Inference Heuristics" and "The Strong Form of the Practical Inference Heuristics ".
52. For exposition, argument and refinements of the cognitive norm of assertion, see "The Cognitive Norm of Assertion" (draft). The knowledge norm of assertion, as well as the cognitive-epistemic version, are thus epistemic norms. Yet epistemic norms may be overridden by other norms when assertibility is contemplated. So it would be misleading to formulate the normative force as the norm of assertion – since at most it's an epistemic norm of assertion, whereas other normative forces may be at play regarding assertibility, or, without further ado, present it in the form of: Assert that p only if you know that p: Such a formulation seems to convey the message that, all things considered, such a norm should be abided to. Such a reading may seem to be reinforced when approached from a Gricean outlook. Yet Williamson and others recognize some aspects of this weakness by resorting to back-up defenses such as the resort to excusability – which nevertheless doesn't neutralize the violation of the norm.
53. E.g., a wife can deliberate about her marriage by employing the premise 'I know my husband doesn't love me', which may not be easy for her to admit, let alone to assert, even privately in her internal monologue, on the way to working out a practical inference regarding the future of her marriage.
54. Such as the strong form of the practical inference heuristic, or the general form of practical reasoning. 
55. If he opts to go beyond the practical inference heuristic into a more general form of practical reasoning, he needs to consider alternative pertinent actions that are available to him and pertinent contingencies that he should heed.
56. For my treatment of the repercussions of this pragmatic account on the lottery case, see my "The Steering Role of Knowledge and Admissible Practical Inferences: Applications and Repercussions" (manuscript). A full treatment of the lottery case requires, as I see it, a strong input from the truth conditions of knowledge ascriptions along the lines of the Indicativity account I offered.
57. Even of its strong form.
58. And thus doesn't allow for probabilities or other quantitative considerations, let alone notions such as 'the EU of an action'.
59. Bear in mind that practical reasoning may have a practical inference form – i.e., an inference whose premises are asserted and whose conclusion specifies an action to be taken – without being a practical inference itself.
60. Yet note that Stanley is more tentative regarding the schema for truth conditions that he offers, and he himself points out a few examples where these truth conditions don't hold up – in particular, the high-attributor/low subject case (i.e., his variation with Bill), as well as temporal, counterfactual, and modal cases. I show how the pragmatic approach above accounts for these cases in "The Pragmatic Role of 'Know', Pragmatic Encroachment, Semantic Intuitions, Counterexample to Contextualism and SSI, Examples Stanley Couldn't Handle, the Vicarious Role of Audience, Audiences as Rational Advisors, and Pragmatic Inconsistencies."
61. This conception plays a major role for DeRose in his proposed treatment of skepticism. But this aspect of his account falls outside the scope of this paper. In my view, when applied to skepticism, the issue is epistemic retraction rather than pragmatic retraction, which the phenomenon discussed in this paper.
62. DeRose doesn't seem to provide precise specification for the comparison between these two parameters. Yet even such a rough characterization would suffice for the counter-example I offer below to hold.
63. DeRose's formulation of the bank example does include some skeptical element, where the wife, in her response, mentioned that banks sometimes change their opening hours. This is a way of pointing out to an error possibility. I differ from DeRose regarding whether skeptical and importance (or stakes) considerations call for a combined treatment, such as the contextualist treatment, since, on my view, pragmatic retractions and skeptical retractions are very different phenomena, calling for very different treatments – pragmatic and semantic/cognitive treatments respectively, and should be pulled apart and each explained on its own terms.
64. I happen to disagree, especially regarding the full-scale retraction counting as true, but also whether the husband's assertion 'I know the bank is open on Saturday' at the first stage counts as true at that stage (on my account of KK, only 'The bank is open on Saturday' is epistemically assertible by him). Regarding the full-scale retraction in the second stage, on my view it's neither epistemically assertible nor true (leaving aside pragmatic aspects). But DeRose can still make his point here, given his endorsement of Williamson's knowledge norm of assertion, even if he were to appeal to a milder retraction, and so I will not belabor this point here. See my "Embedded Knowledge" (draft). 
65. That is, as the husband's assertions. I would assume Stanley to expect that responders, when questioned about "Does the husband know that the bank is open on Saturday?" on the two occasions would take him to know in the first occasion but not to know on the second. (One perhaps can ask different responders the question regarding the two stages, presented in isolation, if one is concerned by a carry-on effect of the first question on the second. In general, we know empirically that order of questions of this sort does impact responders' answers, which may seem to invoke a framing effect. Stanley may consider it as a 'framing' effect that superimposes on the stakes' effect. The intuitions that the example is supposed to invoke would have an effect in the same direction as the supposed framing effect, and thus would, presumably, for contextualism and SSI, interfere with what they perceive to be the phenomenon of the effects of the ascriber's context or the subject's stakes on the threshold.) 
66. Yet, as I understand him, Hawthorne no longer stands behind his Interest-Relative Invariantism that he espoused in his Knowledge and Lotteries, OUP, 2004. 
67. Stanley takes the account to hold in a deliberational setting.
68. I skirt here the important issue of the difference between objective and perceived stakes. The example can be modified to suit either variant.
69. I prefer the weaker one, since it would do: Given appropriate version of the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, on the basis of the evidence, it is assertible.
70. An alternative formulation of my response in the example would be: "In this case, I can't say that I know that the bank is open." This assertion is indeed assertible. The formulation that DeRose uses is not, on my position, epistemically assertible. Whether it is overall assertible depends on how much weight the husband needs to place on his assertion in order for it to be effective. This would vary with various ways of filling up the example, and is not central to our point here. #
71. If we are to resort to the original formulation of the example by DeRose, then my response could be formulated as: "I then don't know now that the bank is open on Saturday". If this response is true (or count as true) in the first stage, then it is true (or count as true) in the third stage, since neither the contextual standard nor my (the subject's) stakes have changed.
72. I take a deliberational setting to be one in which a decision and/or action is being contemplated and which drives, or lurks behind, the conversation (or private monologue). To the best of my knowledge, Stanley provides no explanation as to why he requires that the subject by party to a deliberational setting for his account. After all, stakes can be high when the setting is not deliberational – e.g., when you don't have any decision to make, as when awaiting a decision of a committee or of a court, after all the processes that needs to be covered and lead to that outcome, insofar as they depend on you, have been completed. DeRose makes more sense here, since on his view, the standard remains high even when you are not party to any deliberation. On the account I offer here, the pertinent assertions have the status of being potential premises of practical inferences, or of affecting such premises, and hence when the speaker is a party to a deliberative context on which he can have causal impact can potentially make a difference, reflecting back on the rational assertibility of the speaker's assertions and whether they project the steering role of knowledge.
73. When DeRose and I are in agreement about depositing now at the end, the majority has decided what to do. 
74. Playing with open cards is spelling out one's evidence and rational considerations, if any, that underpin the assertion. For a more elaborate discussion of the open cards/closed cards distinction, see my "Assertorial Decisions, Practical Inference, and Heuristics of Deciding" (manuscript).  
75. I can respond to my friend's challenge in a stronger manner, saying: "Yes, I can be considered as knowing that the bank is open on Saturday".  This formulation brings out explicitly my position as taking myself to know it, without explicitly asserting that I know it, and thus while avoiding an embedded knowledge construction that can be viewed as an outcome of an operative knowledge norm of assertion (either in Williamson's version or on mine).
76. With an implicit concurrence of my friend. 
77. Again, since in fact, as I expect in the example, my friend does go along with my decision.
78. And, perhaps, am not eager to wait for long while he deposits his check.
79. I expect him to go along with how I construe the situation, and don't think it is necessary to weigh in on him, thereby making the invocation of pragmatic pressure unnecessary.







